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Summary 
Højesteret asked the Court of Justice of the European Unions for a 
preliminary ruling of the situation of Post Danmark abusive dominant 
position under article 102 TFEU. Post Danmark had applied price strategies 
acquired from synergies maintained from its range of products. Post 
Danmark was able to force prices down on the relevant market for 
unaddressed mail in the market of Denmark. The pricing held below cost for 
the Coop group and above cost for Spar and SuperBest assessed in this 
essay. The CJEU discussed abuse of dominant position, the competition on 
the merits test, pricing above and below cost, the ‘as-efficient competitor’ 
test, price discrimination, objective justification and special responsibility in 
the judgment and every aspect has been discussed and analysed in this 
essay. The purpose of this essay was to see how the Post Danmark judgment 
was dealt with by the European court and how the judgment would lead to a 
new approach concerning how to solve cases of abusive behaviour in the 
area of Union Competition law.   
 
The test Competition on the merits is a threshold that all the companies that 
are allegedly abusing their position have to walk through. This test took 
form in Hoffman La Roche but was changed in the judgment of Post 
Danmark to include the working of detriment of consumers instead of 
competition. The AKZO-test was moderated to the Average incremental 
cost test in the judgment and was assessed in this essay with the conclusion 
that we have not seen every abusive situation been evaluated yet and that 
case law is constantly changing. This test was applicable because Post 
Danmark used its costs on different markets to find synergies in 
infrastructure and in the common costs. It was therefore essential in looking 
at these costs and seeing to the effect of what lower prices might lead to.  
 
The selective low pricing concept and case law was discussed in the 
Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi but was not stated in the courts 
judgment and did therefore not provide us with any new information. Price 
discrimination was seen in the judgment not to be by itself an abuse but 
together with negative effects or unlawful conduct made by the dominant 
undertaking. All the abovementioned theories and legal aspect have the 
potential to be abuse but may be justified when finding efficiencies of 
benefits for consumers.  
 
The conclusion that was drawn from the discussions and the attempted 
analysis is that holding prices in between average total cost and average 
incremental cost might be seen as abusive if there are large common costs 
attained from a multi-product range or from economies of scope. The ‘as-
efficient compeitotr test will take this information into account when 
assessing the conduct.  
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Sammanfattning 
Højesteret frågade domstolen i Europeiska Unions om förhandsavgörande i 
fallet om Post Danmarks hade missbrukat sin dominerande ställning med 
tolkning under artikel 102 i funktionsfördraget. Post Danmark hade 
tillämpat prisstrategier som förvärvats synergier som upprätthålls av sitt 
utbud av flera produkter. Post Danmark har kunnat tvinga ned priserna på 
den relevanta marknaden för oadresserade brev på den geografiska 
marknaden i Danmark. Prisnivån var satt under kostnaderna för Coop 
koncernen och över kostnaderna för Spar och SuperBest bedömdes i denna 
uppsats. I förhandsavgörandet diskuterade EU-domstolen missbruk av 
dominerade ställning, Pris och prestationskonkurrens testet , prissättning 
ovan och under kostnader, lika effektiv konkurrensprincipen, 
prisdiskriminering, objektivt godtagbara skäl, särskilt ansvar och varje 
aspekt har diskuterats och analyserats. Syftet med uppsatsen var att se hur 
domen i Post Danmark behandlades av de europiska domstolen och om 
denna skulle föranleda en ny strategi för hur man bör lösa missbruk av 
dominerande ställning inom EUs konkurrensrätt.  
 
Testet angående Pris och prestationskonkurrens är en tröskel för alla företag 
som påstås missbruka sin ställning bör kliva över. Detta testet var skapat i  
Hoffman La Roche, men ändrades i domen av Post Danmark att omfatta 
bearbetning av skada för konsumenterna istället för konkurrensen. De 
omgjorda AKZO-testen till det inkrementala kostnader-testet i 
förhandsavgörandet utvärderades i denna uppsats med slutsatsen att vi inte 
har sett alla framtida situationer än och att rättspraxis är i ständig förändring. 
Detta test var tillämpligt på den grunden att Post Danmark använda alla sina 
kostnader på marknaden för att hitta synergier i infrastrukturen och i 
samkostnaderna. Det var därför väsentligt att titta på dessa kostnaderna och 
se vart dessa lägre kostnaderna kommer att leda till.  
 
Det selektivt låga priskonceptet och den tillhörande rättspraxis diskuterades 
i Generaladvokatens Mengozzi förslag till förhandsavgörande men  förekom 
inte i domstolens domslut och därför föranleder inte någon ny information. 
Prisdiskriminering sågs i domen att inte vara ett missbruk i sig, utan 
tillsammans med andra negativa effekter eller olagligt beteende från 
företaget i dominerande ställning. Alla ovannämnda teorier och juridiska 
aspekten har potentialen att vara grund för missbruk av dominerade 
ställning men kan rättfärdigas om fördelar i effektivitetshänseende som 
gynnar konsumenter.  
 
Slutsats man kan dra av diskussionen och försöken till analys är att priserna 
på satta mellan den totala kostnaden och de inkrementala kostnaderna kan 
ses som missbruk om det finns stora samkostnader som kan uppnås av ett 
flerproduktutbud stordriftsfördelar. Pris och prestationskonkurrens testet tar 
dessa uppgifter i beaktande vid bedömning av uppträdandet. 
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1 Introduction  
 
1.1 Purpose 
 
Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
prohibited: ‘Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant 
position within the internal market or in a substantial part of it.’ The 
further content of this prohibition and the Commission’s enforcement 
priorities are delineated in the Commission’s Guidance Paper on abusive 
exclusionary conduct from 2009.1 Prior to 2009, the Commission took an 
effect-based approach when evaluating situations involving an abuse of a 
dominant position. However, its Guidance Paper from 2009 the 
Commission switched to an economical approach, which is said to 
provide more legal certainty. Part of this economical approach is the ‘As 
efficient competitor’- test that is applied when a dominant undertaking is 
said to engage in selectively low pricing or predatory pricing.  
 
The purpose of this essay is to examine how selectively low pricing and 
predatory pricing is dealt with under the ‘As-efficient competitor’-test by 
the European courts. More specifically, this essay will review the court’s 
decisions in AKZO2 and Post Danmark A/S3 in order to determine the type 
of legal framework. To be able to assess this question it is key to understand 
that dominant position has already been established, with the relevant 
market criteria for the company involved. The matter of this essay will also 
discuss the abuse arise from pricing strategies. The economic approach 
when assessing abuse was firstly used in the AKZO judgment but later case 
law adopted the effect-based approach. The economical approach is an 
alternative method, still with flaws but allows the Union law to be more 
detailed.4  
 
However, is the Commissions Guidance paper from 2009 helping the 
Commission in their approach towards abuse and showing the narrow 
corridor for the CJEU to walk through? 
 
                                                
1 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant 
undertakings, 2009/C 45/02. 
2 Case C-62/86 AKZO v Commission EU:C:2004:566. 
3 Case C-209/10 Post Danmark, CLI:EU:C:2012:172. 
4 Rousseva, Ekaterina, Marquis, Mel, Hell Freezes Over: A Climate Change for Assessing 
Exclusionary Conduct under Article 102 TFEU, Journal of European Competition Law & 
Practice, 2012, p. 1.  
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In the Post Danmark’s judgment the question arose whether future 
judgments should choose the approach in the Tomra’s judgment5 or the 
AKZO judgment’s approach shall be adopted when solving future situations 
where element of abuse occur.  
 
The Areeda-Turner-test transformed into the AKZO-test in the AKZO 
judgment. This test was again adopted to fit the resulting situation of Post 
Danmark’s behaviour. Scholar suggested that Post Danmark’s judgment 
would be the way of the future with the more economical approach to abuse 
of pricing strategies.   
1.2 Research Question 
In order to achieve the stated purpose, the following question will guide the 
subsequent exposition:  
 
• How was the abusive pricing, made by Post Danmark, been dealt 
with in the Court of Justice of the European Union? 
• Does the CJEU’s ruling in Post Danmark signal a new approach or 
test to abusive pricing? 
  
1.3 Method and Material 
This essay attempts to review and discuss Union case law. Consequently the 
questions stated above will be answered through the application of the 
jurisprudential method i.e. classical method. This involved the use of several 
primary and secondary sources6 such as case law from the European courts 
and the treaties formed by the Commission.  
 
My main focus will be on the case law established by the CJEU but I will 
also examine cases from the General Court. To get a better understanding of 
the case law the Opinion of Advocate Generals will also be discussed.  
 
Ever since the creation of the Sherman Act in 1890, the U.S. has been a 
pioneer country in the area of competition law. As a result, several of the 
doctrines used by the European courts have their origin in U.S. case law. 
Furthermore, questions concerning the economic efficiency of competition 
rules are widely discussed among American scholar. Consequently, I think 
it is only proper to look to the U.S. sources when evaluating the correct 
approach to a problem involving competition law. I have looked at 
guidelines and discussion papers to further illuminate the meaning of the 
case law from the European courts.  
 
                                                
5 Case C- 549/10 P Tomra and Others v Commission, EU:C:2012:221. 
6 Jareborg, Nils, Rättsdogmatik som vetenskap, Svensk Juristtidning, 2004, p. 8.  
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Finally, this essay will have sections containing legal assessment of 
occurring legal aspect and sections containing analysis. The analysis is not 
exclusively seen in these sections but will be on going throughout this essay.   
 
 
1.4 Limitations 
 
The basic concepts of European Competition law will not be defined, as the 
reader should have a basic understanding of this topic. Furthermore, this 
essay will only discuss different price strategies resulting in an abuse of a 
dominant position. Thus, the essay assumes that a dominant position has 
already been established in the given case. This means that any inquiry into 
the relevant geographical and product market will be superfluous. As natural 
monopolies frequently exist in these kinds of case law service of general 
interest will not be further discussed. The debate concerning article 102 (c) 
TFEU, price discrimination and false positives in price discrimination will 
not be discussed in depth, as these topics are extensive.   
 
1.5 Outline  
Chapter one discusses the purpose with the research question along with the 
method used in this essay. Chapter two will introduce the Post Danmark 
judgment and state the legal issues. The threshold of the concept of 
competition on the merits will be discussed in the same chapter. The legal 
issues in the judgment will be developed according to the concept of abuse 
and contrasted to the Tomra judgment in the same chapter. Chapter three 
will look at pricing below cost and discuss predatory pricing and the 
applicable tests, such as the AKZO-tests and what criteria that should be 
used and if there are other criteria that could be applied to the same test. The 
‘as-efficient competitor’-test will be introduced, discussed and applied to 
the relevant judgment in chapter four. Chapter five will introduce selective 
low pricing, discuss and assess the most relevant case law and principles 
needed in order to make an analysis. Price discrimination is a concept that is 
evaluated in the judgment hence a discussion will take place in chapter six 
to see if there is any new development steamed from the Post Danmark’s 
judgment. If the court in any judgment establishes abuse the possibilities for 
the dominant undertaking to justify the behaviour exist. Therefore, the 
concepts of objective justifications and special responsibility are assessed in 
chapter seven. The same chapter will discuss the Intel judgment in short to 
see how and if the CJEU changed its position and what the future might 
look like. Concluding remarks and the answers to the research questions 
will be made in chapter eight. Each chapter will have one or more sections 
for the analysis but the analysis is not focused only to these sections.  
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2 The Post Danmark Judgment  
In order to better comprehend the essay, this chapter will introduce and 
describe the background of the Post Danmark judgment. The legal 
discussion made by the Court, will thereafter be summarized, seen in section 
2.1.1, followed by a discussion of the concept of abuse acquired from the 
summary. This discussion is seen in section 2.2.1. How the abovementioned 
concept corresponds with competition on the merits will then be discussed 
in section 2.3. As competition on the merits is a concept that focuses on 
what is lawful, the writer will argue if in fact this concept sets a threshold 
for abusive behaviour.  
 
 
2.1 Background of the Post Danmark’s 
Judgment  
It is the Court’s understanding that Post Danmark A/S should be seen as a 
dominant undertaking in the sector selling the service for the distribution of 
unaddressed mail (brochures, telephone directories, guides, local and 
regional newspapers etc.).7 The Court has therefore not evaluated the step 
for of proving the relevant market. The relevant product market was 
concluded to be distribution of unaddressed mail and Denmark as the 
relevant geographical market. Post Danmark had previously been a natural 
monopoly supplying mail nationally.8 When the market for mail services 
was liberalised Forbruger-Kontakt became the main competitor as it 
acquired numerous minor companies on the same market. In the end of 2003 
Post Danmark met with SuperBest, Spar and the Coop group negotiating a 
lower price than Forbruger-Kontakt could supply for their services of 
unaddressed mail in Denmark. Negotiations were held with both services 
providers, but Post Danmark manages to give a marginally lower price to 
the companies. Forbruger-Kontakt claimed that the price level set by Post 
Danmark had different rates than pre-existing customer and that these prices 
could not be justified. The Danish court (Konkurrenceankenævnet) came to 
the conclusion that Post Danmark did not cover its average total cost but its 
incremental costs. Post Danmark’s defence was based on the concept of 
economies of scale hence stating in the Order of Reference that the cost of 
distribution for unaddressed mail decreased by DKK 0.13 between the 
periods of 2003-2004. Konkurrencerådet could not find the economies of 
scale argument sufficient and the cost reduced to the same household was 
not linked to the sender of the items. Konkurrencerådet came to a decision 
on the 29th of September 2004. Konkurrenceankenævnet later upheld this 
decision on the 1st of July 2005. Konkurrencerådet also upheld 
                                                
7 Case C-209/10 Post Danmark, para. 3.  
8 Ibid, para. 3.  
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Konkurrencerådets decision from the 24th of November 2004 on the basis 
that Post Danmark did not show any intent to eliminate competition by 
predatory pricing.  
 
It was argued in both authorities’ decision that Post Danmark had not 
abused its dominant position through predatory pricing but with the use of 
secondary-line price discrimination. Post Danmark appeal this decisions to 
Østre Landsret (eastern regional court), which also upheld this decision as 
abuse of pricing policies was based on the fact that the customers came from 
Forbruger-Kontakt. These policies were compared with Post Danmark’s 
already existing customers.  
 
Post Danmark used the AKZO judgment as evidence to show that the intent 
is necessary to establish an abuse. Konkurrencerådet, on the other hand, had 
the interpretation that intent is not necessary to prove in order to establish an 
abuse when the price level is set between average total cost and average 
incremental costs.  
 
The proceedings went to the Danish Supreme Court, Højesteret, which 
referred questions to the court of Justice for preliminary rulings.  
(1)      Is Article 82 EC to be interpreted as meaning that selective 
price reductions on the part of a dominant postal undertaking 
that has a universal service obligation to a level lower than 
the postal undertaking’s average total costs, but higher than 
the provider’s average incremental costs, constitutes an 
exclusionary abuse, if it is established that the price was not 
set at that level for the purpose of driving out a competitor? 
(2)      If the answer to question 1 is that a selective price reduction 
in the circumstances outlined in that question may, in certain 
circumstances, constitute an exclusionary abuse, what are 
the circumstances that the national court must take into 
account?’9 
What criteria must be used to establish an exclusionary abuse under Article 
82 EC (now article 102 TFEU) when the price level is held between average 
total costs and average incremental cost? 
2.1.1 CJEU’s Judgment  
In what situations can a selective low pricing to a single customer be 
considered abusive? Abuse cannot be solely based on the dominant position 
under article 102 TFEU. A dominant undertaking’s behaviour is lawful as 
the concept of competition on the merits is respected. One can therefore 
reach the conclusion that competition on the merits provides justification for 
larger market shares and dominance. Furthermore when a company is 
                                                
9 Ibid, para. 18.  
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holding a dominant position it has a special responsibility not to distort 
competition on the internal market. A competitive environment is essential 
to the internal market as focus lies on creating efficiencies. Companies that 
are not as efficient don’t have the capacity to compete on the market and is 
therefore not in demand by consumers according to ‘price, choice, quality or 
innovation’10. When these elements are abused consumers are harmed.11 
The fact that Post Danmark held a legal monopolistic position before the 
market was liberalised must be reflection upon in the assessment. The fact 
that the market was liberalised should be a sign that competition should 
thrive and that special responsibility for Post Danmark is held by not 
operating in a way that will impair genuine competition on the internal 
market.12 Under article 102 TFEU certain prices strategies will be 
prohibited. There are a few price strategies that are unlawful and will 
foreclose effective competition on the market. These strategies are therefore 
not caught by the concept competition on the merits.13 When the Court has 
delivered its assessment, the court has taken into account if there has been 
any ‘dissimilar condition applied to a equivalent transactions with other 
trading parties’14 that could lead to distortion of competition.15  
Predatory pricing is a classic example of a price strategy that is prohibited. 
The test concerning predatory pricing was developed in the AKZO judgment 
and is consequently named the AKZO-test. This test is introduced in 
paragraph 26 of the judgment of Post Danmark. The AKZO-test covers 
abuse when the price level is held below average total cost. Intent is 
evaluated when the price level is kept below average total cost but above 
average variable cost.16 This test was only semi-applicable in Post Danmark 
judgment as Post Danmark was operating on several markets. The 
benchmark used by the Danish Government was instead average 
incremental costs. The definition of average incremental costs used by the 
Danish Government were ‘those costs destined to disappear in the short or 
medium term (three to five years), if Post Danmark were to give up its 
business activity of distributing unaddressed mail’17. Post Danmark were 
able to use the same infrastructure for unaddressed mail as for the universal 
service obligations.18 A test to identify the main shares of the great bulk was 
preformed.19   
The price strategy used by Post Danmark, towards Forbruger-Kontakt, could 
have the effect of foreclosure if intent was to proven. The threshold for 
                                                
10 Ibid, para. 22.  
11 Case C‑52/09 TeliaSonera Sverige EU:C:2011:83, para. 24. 
12 Case C-209/10 Post Danmark, para. 23.  
13 Ibid, para. 25.  
14 Ibid, para. 26.  
15 Ibid, para. 26.  
16 Ibid, para. 27.  
17 Ibid, para. 31.  
18 Ibid, para. 32.  
19 Ibid, para. 34. 
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proving intent is rather high and the Court concluded that the evidence put 
forward was insufficient to satisfy this criterion. Post Danmark was clearly 
using price discrimination towards Forbruger-Kontakt but this concept does 
not automatically show that there is an exclusionary abuse.20 The Court held 
that  
‘charging different customers or different classes of customers 
different prices for goods or services whose costs are the same or, 
conversely, charging a single price to customers for whom supply 
costs differ, cannot of itself suggest that there exists an exclusionary 
abuse’.21 
When the Court assessed the price levels given to the Coop group, 
SuperBest and Spar is was implied that the price level offered to the Coop 
group did not manage Post Danmark to cover its average total cost. 
However, did in the cases of SuperBest and Spar.22 The Court found that no 
exclusionary behaviour existed as only one of three price levels offered, to 
F-K customer, was held below average total cost nonetheless above average 
incremental cost.23 Forbruger-Kontakt was able to maintain its position on 
the market for unaddressed mail; even after the lower price level was 
provided to the Coop group. There was no sufficient evidence proving the 
exclusionary abuse existed on the market. One can therefore conclude that 
an ‘equally efficient’ competitors is able to compete with Post Danmark’s 
price level in the long-run without being foreclosed on the relevant market 
for unaddressed mails.24 Forbruger-Kontakt did even manage to retrieve 
Coop’s custom in 2007 and a short while later Spar’s custom.25  
The Court concluded in the judgment that if the national court found Post 
Danmark to be guilty of abuse, objective justifications could be reasoned by 
the undertaking.26 The concept contains efficiency gains and consumer 
benefits and Post Danmark has the burden of proof if found guilty.  
Efficiencies can distortion competition if the exclusionary effect is 
counterbalanced. These efficiency gains must be counterbalanced on the 
relevant market and it may not remove all or most existing sources of actual 
or potential competition.27 
 
                                                
20 Ibid, para. 29-30. 
21 Ibid, para. 30.  
22 Ibid, para. 35-36.  
23 Ibid, para. 37.  
24 Ibid, para. 38.  
25 Ibid, para. 39.  
26 Ibid, para. 40. 
27 Ibid, para. 41-42.  
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2.2 CJEU’s judgment in Post Danmark- 
Article 102 TFEU applied 
The legal assessment of the judgment of Post Danmark will be discussed 
and assessed in detail in the below chapters. This discussion will be based 
on the summary of the judgment made in section 2.1.1. To develop an in 
depth knowledge of the judgment each legal aspect of the judgment will be 
assess in the below section starting with section 2.2.1. 
2.2.1 The Aims of Article 102 TFEU – Protection 
‘Consumers, Competitors or Both?’28   
 
Article 102 TFEU contains the prohibition against the abuse of a dominant 
position in the EU competition law. The aim of the provision is to protect 
both the needs of the consumer and the competitive environment of the 
internal market.29 The closer interpretation of the rule is constantly evolving 
along with its subject matter. The idea of a flexible rule against abuse of a 
dominant position is also apparent from its non-exhaustive list of potential 
abuses.30 Thus, allowing for further development in the future.  
 
A necessary element of Article 102 TFEU is the existence of a dominant 
position. Dominance is established either through the existence of a large 
market share or a ‘position of economical strength’31 it is important to obey 
competition on the merits. The dominant position held by Post Danmark 
was proven regarding unaddressed mail in Denmark. Post Danmark held a 
market share in between 44-47%32 whereas the Commission suggest that the 
benchmark for dominance was after 40% on the relevant market.33 The 
Commission’s Enforcement Priorities Paper basis this benchmark on case 
law. Two examples are the British Airway’s judgment, which concluded a 
dominant position of 40-46%34 and 40% in the judgment of United 
                                                
28 Craig, Paul, De Búrca, Gráinne, EU Law, Text, Cases, and Materials, Oxford University 
Press, 2011, Fifth Edition, p. 1025. 
29 Case C-95/04 P British Airways v Commission, EU:C:2007:166, para. 57, Case C-85/76 
Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission EU:C:1979:36, para. 91, Case C-322/81 Nederlandsche 
Banden-Industrie-Michelin v Commission, EU:C:1983:168, para. 70, Case C-62/86 AKZO 
v Commission, para. 69.  
30 Whish, Richard, Bailey, David, Competition Law, Seventh Edition, Oxford University 
Press, New York, 2012, p. 193 & Case C-6/72 Europemballage Corp, v Commission 
(Continental Can), EU:C:1975:50, para. 26. 
31 Jones, Alison, Sufrin, Brenda, EU Competition Law, Text, Cases, And Materials, p. 393.  
32 Petit, Nicolas, http://chillingcompetition.com/2013/02/28/post-danmark-more-than-just-
one-case/ accessed 14 May 2014.  
33 Guidance Paper, para. 14. 
34 Ezrachi, Ariel, Article 82 EC, Reflections on its Recent Evolution, Hart Publishing, 2009, 
Anderman, Steven, Chapter 5: The Epithet That Dares Not Speak its Name: The Essential 
Facilities Concept in Article 82 EC and IPR after the Microsoft Case, p. 88-89 & Case T-
219/99 British Airways v Commission (2003) EU:T:2003:343. 
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Brands.35 The conclusion of Post Danmark’s market share was stated in the 
Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi and was not examined in the CJEU 
judgment.36 Hence, limiting the discussion of relevant market.  
 
The interpretation of article 102 TFEU has been developed over time and is 
constantly evolving, as it exists to protect the needs of consumers and the 
internal market.37 The treaty developing the prohibitions found that the 
article should not be exhaustive38 thereby opening up for future 
development of the article 102 TFEU39 as the internal market and the 
consumers may change. The element of cross-boarder is essential when 
finding behaviour that is prohibited by the treaty, hence defined 
generously.40 It is implied that the purpose of the article shall strive to 
maintain or strengthen the competitive environment on the internal 
market.41 The case-by-case development is preferred in the examination if a 
dominant undertaking abuses its practices. Principles in line with the 
purpose of the article are the freedom to choice, freedom of entry, and 
principle of discrimination furthermore be upheld so that competition is not 
distorted.42  
 
In order to show that a dominant undertaking is abusing its position on the 
market the Commission must provide information of negative effects, 
principally who or what is hurt by the conduct. Exploitative and 
exclusionary are the two existing abuses whereas the latter is a consequence 
of abuse towards competitors while the former is applied when consumers 
have been injured. An abusive dominant firm can injure competitors either 
through a potential effect or an actually effect. The protection of the 
competitors was not the purpose of the treaty, only consumers would be 
protected was argued. However, the General Court has aimed to protect 
competitors in the Microsoft judgment43. Conversely, the American 
perspective confirms the treaty’s purpose hence competitors should not be 
protected.44 Competitors are protected in order to maintain the competitive 
environment, which might lead to lower prices for consumers.  
                                                
35 Case 27/76 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission 
EU:C:1978:22, para. 108.  
36 Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in Case C-209/10, Post Danmark, delivered on 
24 May 2011, EU:C:2011:342. 
37 Case C-95/04 P British Airways v Commission, para. 57.  
38 Whish, Richard, Bailey, David, Competition Law, p. 193 & Case C-6/72 
Europemballage Corp, v Commission (Continental Can), para. 26.  
39 Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom v Commission EU:C:2010:603, para. 173. 
40 Whish, Richard, Bailey, David, Competition Law, p. 146.  
41 Case C-85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, para. 91, Case C-322/81 Michelin v 
Commission, para. 70, Case C-62/86 AKZO v Commissio, para. 69,  
Case C-95/04 P British Airways v Commission, para. 66, & Case C-202/07 P France 
Télécom v Commission, EU:C:2009:214, para. 104. 
42 Case C-322/81 Michelin v Commission, para. 73, and British Airways v Commission, 
para. 67 & Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom v Commission, para. 175. 
43 Case T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission, EU:T:2007:289. 
44 Swaine, Edward T, "Competition, Not Competitors,” Nor Canards: Ways of Criticizing 
the Commission, 2002, p.599 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jil/articles/volume23/issue3/Swaine23U.Pa.J.Int'lEcon.
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Article 102 TFEU discusses the potential affect on consumer harm from less 
competition on the market. This was tested in the TeliaSonera Sverige 
judgment.45 Undertakings try to acquire a large market share by competing 
on the merits and competing in a way that are within the boundaries of what 
is lawful under article 102 TFEU. This article exists as to ensure that less 
efficient competitor can be foreclosed out of the market without any 
consequences. To establish an abuse the benchmarks test competition on the 
merits has been applied to see if the behaviour is suitable on the market. 
This concept will be discussed in detail in the below section 2.3.  
 
2.3 Competition on the Merits 
Competition on the merits is a legal test that set the premier threshold for 
finding abuse. Competition on the merits should work as a safe haven for 
dominant undertaking that is genuinely trying to compete on the market 
without abuse. The term was first established by the CJEU in the Hoffman 
La Roche judgment phrased as taken into account ‘normal competition’46. 
The phrase was superseded to ‘competing within the basis of quality’47. The 
Commission should not intervene if the competition on the market is within 
these thresholds. These thresholds do mainly concern price, choice, quality 
or innovation. This conduct may enable dominant undertaking to increase 
market share and be able to lower prices on the market48 without being 
examined as abusive. The Commission will neither intervene to ensure that 
a less efficient competitor is protected on the market.49 The Commission 
will safeguard the competitive process on the market50 and ‘it is in no way 
the purpose of Article 82 EC to prevent an undertaking from acquiring, on 
its own merits, the dominant position on a market.’51 In Post Danmark the 
court used emphasis on protection of the consumers, by ‘has the effect, to 
the detriment of consumers’52 and not competition. However, this concept is 
somewhat flawed, as a clear definition has not been formulated.  
Competition on the merits may, by definition, lead to the departure 
from the market or the marginalisation of competitors that are less 
efficient and so less attractive to consumers from the point of view 
of, among other things, price, choice, quality or innovation.53  
                                                                                                                        
L.597(2002).pdf , accessed 18 May 2014. 
45 Case C-52/09 TeliaSonera Sverige, para. 24.  
46 Case 85/76 Hoffman La Roche, para. 120.  
47 Case 62/86 Akzo v Commission, para. 70.  
48 Case C-209/10 Post Danmark, para. 21.  
49 Ibid, para. 22 & DG Discussion Paper, para. 54.  
50 Guidance Paper, para. 6.  
51 Case C-209/10 Post Danmark, para. 21. 
52 Ibid, para. 24.  
53 Ibid, para. 22 see also Prof. Montis Speech 2004, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-04-212_en.htm?locale=en.  
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The concept was even formulated as being the ability not to distort 
genuine competition on the market.54 The focus should lie on 
maintaining a healthy competitive environment on the market and not 
focus on the competitors.55 When the undertaking disobeys this concept, 
objective justification can be applied if the undertaking is found guilty of 
abuse.  
Scholars have criticised the concept of being undefined.56 The above stated 
conditions what competition should strive towards are not optimally defined 
and the inability to define the concept leaves the door open for abuse. Price, 
for example may foreclose competitive if held at a level too low. When 
competing with prices, the cuts must still ensure competition. Generally, 
when applying a price level above cost this will only have the capacity to 
foreclose a less efficient competitor.57 Applying a price level below cost is 
interpreted as predatory pricing caught by the ‘as efficient competitor’-test 
hence sacrificing profit and thereby incurring losses.58 The conclusion that 
can be drawn is that when competition is decreased and companies have a 
hard time staying on the market, the conditions on the market do not provide 
a environment in line with competition on the merits. Advocate General 
Kirschner has explained that the performance in contrast to this principle for 
profit maximizing companies is disproportionate to the means achieved on 
the internal market.59  
Competition on the merits is applied through the contradiction that if not 
caught by the concept then an abusive behaviour has occurred.60 This 
indefinable concept has led to the fact that article 102 TFEU has been seen 
as too ‘formalistic and inconsistent’61.  
The test must be applied to the conduct to see if there is abuse that will 
foreclose the market.  The Court in the Tomra judgment did not evaluate this 
concept, whereas “the existence of an intention to compete on the merits, 
even if it were established, could not prove the absence of abuse.”62 The 
Court discussed the concept in the Post Danmark judgment and showed that 
no exclusionary effect was found when the undertaking preformed 
accordingly.63 The ability to increase market share and profit was accepted 
                                                
54 Temple Land, J, O’Donoghue, R, The Concept of an Exclusionary Abuse under Article 
82 EC, GCLC Research Papers on Article 82 EC, College of Europe, Bruges, 2005, p. 41. 
55 DG Discussion Paper, para. 54.  
56 Geradin, Damien, Layne-Farrar, Anne, Petit, Nicolas, EU Competition Law and 
Economics, Oxford University Press, Great Britain, 2012, para. 4.135-4.136.  
57 DG Discussion Paper, para. 127.  
58 DG Discussion Paper, para. 93.  
59 Case T-51/89 Tetra Pak Rausing SA v Commission EU:T:1990:41, para. 68.  
60 Ekaterina Rousseva, The Concept of ‘Objective Justification’ of an Abuse of a Dominant 
Position: Can it help to Modernise the Analysis under Article 82 EC?, THE 
COMPETITION LAW REVIEW, Volume 2 Issue 2 March 2006, p. 70. 
61 Ekaterina Rousseva, The Concept of ‘Objective Justification’ of an Abuse of a Dominant 
Position: Can it help to Modernise the Analysis under Article 82 EC?, p. 31. 
62 Case C- 549/10 P Tomra and Others v Commission, para. 22.  
63 Case C-209/10 Post Danmark, para. 22.  
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when competing with this standard.64 The concept is weak at best. The 
Court instead turned to the effect approach of this unlawful behavior.  
2.3.1 May Affect   
The concept of effect developed when trade occurred between Member 
States but the necessity to include trade between member states lie outside 
of the definition. The boundaries for this concept are therefore generous.65 
The concept of ‘may affect’ has been describes in earlier case law as being 
the ‘agreement or practise may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual 
or potential on the pattern of trade between Member States’66. This criterion 
is also to be interpreted widely.67 The Commission examines if this abuse 
will eventually restrict competition i.e. ‘the conduct is capable of having, or 
likely to have, such an effect’68. This important assessment is to show that 
the effect is likely and that speculation is not sufficient.69 This was seen in 
the Post Danmark judgment where threshold for likely or actual effect was 
used.70 It is important to have consumers in mind and see that these are not 
affected negatively.71  The effect-based test will be discussed and analysed 
in the section below.  
 
2.3.2 Legal Assessment of Abuse 
In the judgment of Post Danmark the court stepping away from the 
traditional view of potential effect into the criteria of likely or actual 
effect.72 Earlier case law has operated with the criterion of potentially 
affecting the market. In the Tomra judgment73 the CJEU established that 
actual foreclosuring effect is not required when examining abuse only the 
potential effect.74  
 
The Commission must show that, the behaviour of the dominant 
undertaking has the tendency to affect foreclosure on the market.75 The 
loyalty rebates found in Tomra and Hoffman La Roche had a potential 
                                                
64 Ibid, para. 25.  
65 Commission Notice, Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 
and 82 of the Treaty, Official Journal C 101, 27/04/2004, p. 81-96, para. 22. 
66 Whish, Richard, Bailey, David, Competition Law, p. 146.  
67 Ibid, p. 146. 
68 Case T-203/01 Manufacture Française des Pneumatiques Michelin v Commission 
EU:T:2003:250, para. 239 & Case T-219/99, British Airways v. Commission, para. 293. 
69 Guidelines of intra-state trade, para. 43.  
70 Case C-209/10 Post Danmark, para. 44.  
71 Guidelines of intra-state trade, para. 43.  
72 Case C-209/10 Post Danmark, para. 44.  
73 Case C-549/10 P Tomra and Others v Commission.  
74 Swaak, Christof, Wesseling, Rein, Braeken, Bas, ten Have, Floris, ECJ and EFTA court 
judgments on the abuse of dominance: confirmation and refinement of existing case law, 
European Union, 2012, http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a21f69cd-11ac-
4592-a130-36461ac1dc1f  accessed 10 May 2014. 
75 Case C-549/10 P Tomra and Others/ Commission, para. 68.  
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exclusionary effect on the market. The Hoffman La Roche test, competition 
on the merits, was not applicable to Tomra. The court ignored the test. The 
application of the test should be based on the fact that the competitor’s 
product lost in demand.76 The agreements made by Tomra and the 
customers were not formally seen to be exclusionary however, implied in 
the rebates given.77 The rebates must be shown no to remove or restrict the 
buyer’s freedom to choose his sources of supply, to bar competitors from 
access to the market, or to strengthen the dominant position by distorting 
competition.78 Tomra’s rebate strategy was confirmed in the Hoffman La 
Roche doctrine to have the same effects as an exclusionary agreement79 but 
also exploitative as it will be towards existing customers.80 Effects are not 
necessarily to be established but at least shown.81 Tomra’s capacity to affect 
competition is sufficient when looking at behaviour that may lead to the 
restrictions on the market.82   
 
Contrasts between the Tomra judgment and the Post Danmark judgment 
were the market shares and the use of the concept of competition on the 
merits. Tomra had a market share above 70% and sometimes even higher.83 
This must be taken into account when assessing the effects on the market. 
The threshold for competition on the merits was applied in the Post 
Danmark judgment, which lead to the use of the ‘as-efficient competitor’- 
test. Another fact in contrast to the Post Danmark judgment is that Tomra 
was abusing loyalty rebates and the ‘as-efficient competitor’-test could not 
be applied to economical data available.84  
 
For the Commission to establish an alleged abusive effect the following 
criteria must be examined; percentage of market affected, duration and the 
how regularly the abuse occurred.85 Competitor may show that the market 
share has changed on the relevant market or that competitor has been 
foreclosed on the relevant market.86 According to Post Danmark, actual 
                                                
76 Case C-85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, para. 90.  
77 Case C-549/10 P Tomra and Others v Commission, para. 70. 
78 Ibid, para. 71. 
79 Lundqvist, Björn, Skovgaard Ølykke, Grith, Post Danmark, now concluded by the 
Danish Supreme Court: Clarification of the Selective Low Pricing Abuse and Perhaps the 
Embryo of a New Test under article 102 TFEU? European Competition Law Review, 
Thomas Reuter UK Limited, 2013, p. 488. 
80 Ibid, p. 488. 
81 Ibid, p. 488.  
82 Case C-549/10 P Tomra and Others v Commission, para. 68.  
83 Ibid, para. 10.  
84 Samà, Danilo, The Antitrust Treatment of Loyalty Discounts and Rebates in the EU 
Competition Law: in Searcg of an Economic Approach and a Theory of Consumer Harm, 
LUISS ”Guido Carli” University of Rome, Rome, Italy, 2012, p. 38.  
85 Guidance Paper, para. 20.  
86 Ibid, para. 20.  
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foreclosing effect must be show.87 The Danish Supreme Court came to the 
same conclusion.88   
2.3.3 Analysis 
One can argue that the judgment of Post Danmark, was developed in 
deliberate way to suggest a more economical approach of solving the 
question of abuse. As the threshold for showing effect increased to likely or 
actual abuse this can lead to a greater legal certainty. The element of 
assessing potential effect has for a long time held strong ground in Union 
competition law. The fact that the threshold has changed with the Post 
Danmark judgment shows that the burden of proof for the Commission 
should be at a higher level when assessing future abuse. The Commission 
must prove, like before, not that the abuse has lead to any actual 
consequence on the market but that the likelihood of future consequence 
may occur. As the Commission has a higher threshold for showing future 
effects on the market the companies will feel more comfortable operating on 
the market. This will in the extension lead to more legal certainty and 
understanding for the operator on the market. This will attract entries to the 
market and lead to a greater competitive environment. On the other hand, 
the judgment of Tomra closed the door for actors that want to join the 
market, as the effect was assessed with a lower threshold than in the Post 
Danmark judgment. This will affect the environment on the market 
negatively, as insecurities will rise. One might argue that the definition of 
future effects, hence likely or actual abuse provides a better environment for 
larger companies that try to establish themselves. The question arises if the 
Post Danmark judgment has lead to any change on the market as the Tomra 
judgment was published only a few weeks later.  
 
 
                                                
87 Gerard, Damien, Looking back at a 2012 highlight: Post Danmark, Université catholique 
de Louvain, Belgium, 2013, http://kluwercompetitionlawblog.com/2013/01/07/looking-
back-at-a-2012-highlight-post-danmark/ accessed 10 May 2014.  
88 Lundqvist, Björn, Skovgaard Ølykke, Grith, Post Danmark, now concluded by the 
Danish Supreme Court: Clarification of the Selective Low Pricing Abuse and Perhaps the 
Embryo of a New Test under article 102 TFEU?, p. 485.  
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3 Pricing Below Average Total 
Cost 
3.1 Background and Assessment of the 
Concept of Predatory Pricing  
The writer will try to describe and assess the pricing below cost situation 
and compare it with the AKZO-standard.89 The AKZO-standard is formed 
the average incremental costs test and is essential to the understanding on 
the judgment. This chapter will evaluate both tests, the recoupment criterion 
found in American antitrust law and the concept of intent to see how the 
court has assessed these in the judgment. The writer will in the end of every 
section try to analyse these concept.  
The Commission uses the concept of ‘investment’ in the DG Competition 
Disussion Paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to 
exclusionary abuses whilst the concept of ‘sacrifice’ is being used in the 
Guidance Paper on the applying of Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive 
exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, when describing the lower 
price level and recoupment of losses.90 
According to Richard Posner at the University of Chicago, predatory pricing 
is the same as ‘pricing at a level calculated to exclude from the market an 
equally or more efficient competitor’91. This result is typically achieved 
through prices below cost, which are sufficiently low to force out any 
competitors. It is important to note that the dominant undertaking will only 
have to sustain the lower prices in the short-run. Once the competitor has 
exited the market, the dominant undertaking will be able to recoup its losses 
through higher prices.92 Negative effects of predatory pricing have been 
argued to be short-run allocative inefficiencies, deadweight loss found in 
case of monopolies and social losses.93  
 
Predatory pricing can be seen as pro-competitive in the short-run since 
consumers will enjoy lower prices and thus, higher welfare, while the 
dominant firm tries to force market exits. However, once the dominant 
undertaking has achieved its goal, the market will return to its depressed 
                                                
89 Case C-209/10, Post Danmark, para. 27.  
90 DG Discussion Paper, para. 97 & Guidance Paper, para. 63-64.  
91 Posner, Richard, Antitrust Law, An economic perspective, The University of Chicago, 
1976, p. 188.  
92 DG Discussion Paper, para. 96.  
93 Joskow, Paul L., Klevorick, Alvin K., A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing 
Policy, The Yale Law Journal, Volume 89, Number 2 December 1979, p. 224.  
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state and consumers will lose choice and quality as the prices are forced to a 
higher price level.94  
 
In order for the undertaking to be able to enjoy the long-run effects steamed 
from this behaviour it must be dominant.95 This will allow the undertaking 
to reap the profit from the conduct, by setting its own higher prices. On the 
other hand if the undertaking were not dominant then there would not be 
any possibility to use the concept of predatory pricing as the dominant 
undertaking have margin of error in its size on the market. Other obstacles 
of using predatory pricing, are if the dominant undertaking is wrongly 
interpreting the prey ability to stay on the market and if other competitors 
manage to capitalize on the profit that the dominant undertaking was to 
recoup.96  
 
Prices must be set below cost in order to foreclose an ‘as efficient 
competitor’.97 The Areeda-Turner test is for assessing abusive behaviour 
below cost. This test concerns a cost/price analysis.98 One can criticise the 
test for applying the short-run marginal cost, as it is too difficult to assess 
the marginal costs.99 This is because of the fact that ‘interest, rent, 
depreciation, and other overhead items, because they do not vary in the short 
run with the amount of output produced’100. The moderation of the classical 
test was applicable to the below costs behaviour conducted by AKZO. The 
test adopted in the judgment should not be assessed by hypothetical 
information but by practical and rational alternatives.101 The former tests 
relevant criteria are applied differently depending on, in which legal systems 
the undertaking is operating. The American legal system was using 
recoupment and the Union is using intent. The AKZO judgment will first be 
investigated in which led to the AKZO-tests.     
 
3.1.1 AKZO v Commission  
ECS produced benzoyl peroxide, a chemical, which could be used in the 
bleaching process of flour milling, as well as a catalyst in plastic products. 
However, when ECS tried to enter the latter market, the incumbent company 
AKZO responded by offering ECS’s largest customer in flour milling lower 
prices for their benzoyl peroxide needs, ECS complained to the 
Commission, which found AKZO’s conduct in breach of Article 102 TFEU.  
                                                
94 DG Discussion Paper, para. 96.  
95 Ibid, para. 97.  
96 Ibid, para. 97 & Jones, Alison, Sufrin, Brenda, EC Competition Law, Text, Cases, And 
Materials, p. 417-418.  
97 Guidance Paper, para. 23-27.  
98 Whish, Richard, Bailey, David, Competition Law, p. 740-741. 
99 Joskow, Paul L., Klevorick, Alvin K., A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing 
Policy, p. 250.  
100 Posner, Richard, Anittrust Law, An Economic Perspective, p. 191.  
101 Guidance Paper, para. 65.  
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AKZO enjoyed a dominant position of half the market, 50%, and the whole 
market for organic peroxides in the Community. AKZO used price below 
cost to foreclose ECS. AKZO was fined for this behaviour a sum of € 10 
million and were to terminate the infringement immediately. Different 
customer should not be price discriminated on the same market. The 
Commission manage to prove that there was an intent to foreclose ECS. 
When competing in the Community, quality and scope of competition 
should determine success whilst price-strategies should not be seen as 
legitimate.102 Built from the same interpretation from the concept of 
competition on the merits.  
As mentioned before the Areeda-Turner test was not applicable as the court 
decided to adopted ATC and AVC. As prices were held above the AVC the 
ECJ (now CJEU) used a cost-based test and annulled the Commissions 
decision and lower the fines to € 7,5 million. The Court came to the 
conclusion that AKZO had abused its position with predatory prices. The 
fact that ECS were not foreclosed but that intent existed is enough to show 
abuse.103 This kind of behaviour may lead to effective elimination of an 
equally efficient competitor, as the actual effect was not proven.104  
 
3.1.2 The AKZO-Tests  
The ECJ adopted a new cost/price-test from the judgment of AKZO. This 
test was formulated on a two-test rule for assessing predatory pricing under 
the article 86 EEC (now 102 TFEU). The assessment bases on the fact that 
dominant undertakings have no interest in applying a price level that is 
lower than different cost without looking to gain an advantage towards other 
competitors in the future. In the best case scenario the dominant undertaking 
is hoping to eliminate competition and later recoup profit through 
dominance on the market.105 The benchmarks considered in the tests are 
ATC and AVC.  
 
3.1.2.1 The First AKZO-Test 
The unlawful price competition, predatory pricing was firstly introduced in 
the in Union with the AKZO judgment. When a dominant undertaking is 
applying prices below AVC it is obvious that there is an interest to force 
market exits.106 The company with the largest economical resources have 
the possibility to last the longest making losses.107 If the dominant 
undertaking is applying price levels below ATC the need to apply intent is 
                                                
102 Ibid, para. 70.  
103 Ibid, para. 115. 
104 Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in Case C-209/10 Post Danmark, para. 65.  
105 Case C-62/86 AKZO v Commission, para.71.  
106 DG Discussion Paper, para. 96.  
107 Case C-62/86 AKZO v Commission, para. 72.  
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low.108 It is implied that market foreclosure is in demand. The prices are 
held at a level making competition impossible. This price level are said to 
be prima facie abusive.109  
 
3.1.2.2 The Second AKZO-Test 
The other price level that the ECJ discussed in the AKZO judgment is the 
price levels found in between ATC and AVC. When applying prices 
between ATC and AVC there must be intent to foreclose one or more 
competitors for abuse to be established.110 As this price level is not giving 
up too much profit in comparison to the first AKZO-test the subjective 
criterion of intent is necessary to conclude abuse. The ECJ used the wording 
of a plan to eliminate a competitor.111  
 
The ability to prove intent is not sufficient as the Commission must show 
that an actual plan exist that’s mission is to eliminate a competitor. 
Professor Bork suggested that it is hard to apply the predatory pricing 
concept, as new entries will always occur when old leave.112 
 
 
3.1.3 Analysis  
The fact that a predatory pricing strategy only can be applied when the 
undertaking is enjoying a dominant position is obvious. The need for 
economical resources is essential to the conduct. The competitor that the 
undertaking is trying to force of the market must have less economical 
resources and this fact must be assessed thoroughly by the undertaking. The 
undertaking will not risk profit and not be able to foreclose the competitor. 
There must be a large difference in market share to be able to minimize the 
risk and the losses. One can argue that the market share in the Post Danmark 
judgment, would allow predatory pricing to apply as Forbruger-Kontakt 
held a smaller market share. Only Coop was given prices below ATC and 
not even below AVC. It is therefore important to assess the intent further 
and is made below. A test used in the Deutsche Post judgment was 
established in Post Danmark taking in the concept of average incremental 
cost which will be discussed below.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
108 Case C-333/94 P Tetra Pak, para. 42. 
109 Ibid, para. 41.  
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3.1.4 The Union’s Criterion of Intent  
Intent is the subjective part of the second AKZO-test and will be further 
discussed here. Intent must use a number of convergent criteria to be 
applicable. There must be a plan to eliminate a competitor.113 The second 
AKZO-test showed that intent is essential and necessary to find 
undertakings abusive when applying a price level between AVC and ATC. 
No effect is necessary to be established if intent is proven.114 The criteria for 
intent established in the Tetra Pak judgment were the ‘duration, the 
continuity and scale of the sales at a loss’115. There were proof that the price 
level of the product were 20% lower in the primary market and up to 50% 
lower prices in other markets.116 Other evidence found can point to intent are 
facts that for example the board of directors clearly stated that there should 
be financial losses in order to fight competition.117 The court established 
intent in the AKZO judgment by looking at which customers that were 
offered prices between ATC and AVC. The customers offered these prices 
were exclusively ECS customers. This showed the strategy of predatory 
pricing as not all the customers on the market were offered low prices. 
There was methodical focusing on ECS customers.118 
In order to acquire documentation proving intent is it necessary to preform 
dawn raids to attain ‘internal documents, schemes, projections and 
prognosis work’119. The intent must be based on specific information that 
shows the intent to exclude a competitor on the market. These documents do 
not only show that the dominant undertaking has the interpretation to 
eliminate competitors but to force a competitor out of the market.120 The 
ECJ developed this idea in the AKZO judgment.   
 
 
3.1.5 Legal Assessment of Intent 
 
Intent to eliminate a competitor can clearly be proven by the Court as 
predatory price levels are given to competitor’s customers. There is usually 
not an extensive strategy to eliminate all competitors at the same time but 
                                                
113 Case C-62/86 AKZO v Commission, para. 72.  
114  Jones, Alison, Sufrin, Brenda, EC Competition Law, Text, Cases, And Materials, p. 
407-408.  
115 Lowe, Philip, EU competition on predatory pricing, Introductory address to the Seminar 
”Pros and Cons of Low Prices”, Stockholm, 5 December 2003, p. 3. & Case T-83/91, Tetra 
Pak.  
116 Lowe, Philip, EU competition on predatory pricing, Introductory address to the Seminar 
”Pros and Cons of Low Prices”, p. 3. & Case T-83/91, Tetra Pak. 
117 Case C-83/91 Tetra Pak, para. 146.  
118 Case C-62/86 AKZO v Commission, para. 113-115.  
119 Lowe, Philip, EU competition on predatory pricing, Introductory address to the Seminar 
”Pros and Cons of Low Prices”, p. 4.  
120 Case C-62/86 AKZO v Commission, para. 72.  
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focuses on lower the price for a few competitors’ customers.121 This gives 
the court a hint of information of which competitor the dominant 
undertaking has the intent to eliminate.  
 
Professor Baumol’s claim that even if the competitors is not eliminated 
when using predatory pricing this gives a disincentives for future market 
entry as a rough competitive market exist.122 Professor Baumol has although 
stated that it is impossible to prove intent as no economist or lawyer has the 
ability to ‘delving into anyone’s mental state’123. This explanation follows 
the same path as in the line with Richard Posner idea that sometimes the 
clumsiness of words can be interpreted as intent.124 Intent has been seen as 
being too vague due to its subjective approach.125 Post Danmark had been 
aggressive toward Forbruger-Kontakt in media but intent was strictly 
interpreted.126 The Danish Court instead focused on price, as intent is harder 
to fully establish.127  
 
3.1.6 Analysis  
To have a plan to eliminate a competitor must be seen as a subjective 
criterion as the Commission tries to establish the dominant undertakings 
willingness to exclude a competitor. Why is it necessary to have a subjective 
plan in a cost-based strategy? There are a number of reasons for this 
purpose. The Court will be able to argue the dominant undertakings plan 
easier but this also gives the undertaking a greater possibility to show 
reasons why the price level were set between ATC and AVC.  
 
The fact of the matter stated by the dominant undertaking is that the reason 
for the lower applied price level is a campaign or rebates to gain market 
share in order to enjoy economies of scale by vending a larger output in the 
future. This would increase consumer welfare for consumers, as prices are 
force down.  
 
When the court has established an abusive conduct by showing that there a 
plan to foreclose a rival of the market it is close to impossible for the 
undertaking to show that there are objective justifications.  
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124  Posner, Richard, Antitrust Law, p. 190.  
125 Sharpes, Dustin, Reintroducing Intent into Predatory Pricing Law, 904 Emory Law 
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3.1.7 The American Criterion of Recoupment  
As intent has not been widely accepted in American Antitrust law the 
focused was instead on recoupment. Hence the applied price level does not 
only have to be between ATC and above AVC but also contain recoupment 
of lost profit.128 In the Brooke judgment129 costs below some level of costs 
was necessary in order to establish abuse by the court. In the short-run the 
dominant undertaking, like the Unions interpretation of the predatory 
pricing strategy, would enjoy losses but able to recoup these in the long-run. 
The recoupment of the losses is essential in order to prove that the 
undertaking was using the concept of predatory pricing strategies.130 This is 
in line with the American antitrust perspective that an abuse should lead to 
an economical advantage. The scheme must be seen as profitable for the 
undertaking.131 Not only must profit be recouped but also market share. But 
on some markets the possibility for recoupment of losses is non-existent, as 
new entries will occur.132 The loss recoupment is not applied in the EU 
competition law when proving predatory pricing.133 On the other hand, the 
economical literature has come to the conclusion that recoupment is the next 
natural step after predatory pricing abuse but there are difficulties in 
applicable of the criterion.134 
 
The reason why recoupment is not so extensively used is because of the fact 
that the undertakings have a hard to collecting the whole recoupment after 
the foreclosure of the competitor.  The negative effects of predatory pricing 
and the need for recoupment is that this will lead to market exits and that 
consumer welfare is decreased and also choice.135 In the Opinion of 
Advocate General Fennelly of Case Compagnie Maritime Belge Transport 
he argued that the possibility for the use of recoupment should exist.136 The 
Commission explains that the recoupment is not required.137 Therefore, the 
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129 Brooke Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 222–24. The Supreme Court’s decision in Brooke 
Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. (509 US 209, 113 S.Ct 2578). & Bolton, 
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CJEU has taken a step away from the recoupment criterion138 also suggested 
in the Opinion of Advocate General Mazák.139 The interest in intent is 
greater.140  
 
3.1.8 Analysis 
One can argue that recoupment is easier to prove than intent as one 
compares the market before and after market exit. Should EU case law start 
to focus on the objectiveness of recoupment instead of intent? As intent is 
strictly interpreted in case law and almost impossible to prove should the 
focus instead lie on recoupment? Is the American way a more respectable 
solution? In theory more companies will be shown to be abusing their 
dominant position if the recoupment is used as this can be based on 
objective economical investigation, as this is easier to prove than intent.  
 
A company that has forced market exit of a competitor cannot raise the price 
level, as this will show recoupment. The ability for the dominant 
undertaking to recoup the losses and hide this fact is impossible in theory.  
As laws in some countries protect companies’ internal information as this is 
seen as know-how, this is hard to collect.141  
  
One can also argue that in theory legal certainty is increased as it is easier to 
prove that recoupment exist by looking at the market shares after the 
competitors has exist the market. On the other hand the competitor may 
have been forced of the market when the Court has established that a 
predatory pricing strategy has been used as this will lead to fewer choices. 
The CJEU focuses on trying to help the competitor before it is too late and 
the American courts try to be objectively correct when proving abuse and 
predatory pricing. But the matter of the fact is that the Brooke judgment was 
the last judgment concerning predatory pricing in American Antitrust law as 
recoupment was impossible to prove. The EU’s intent does win by default.  
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3.1.9 Long-Run Average Incremental Costs142-
Test 
The Areeda-Turner test and the moderated AKZO-tests are not applicable to 
the economical situation in the Post Danmark judgment and therefore the 
average incremental cost test was used. This test is used when assessing 
industries where high fixed costs and low variable costs are present and 
where synergies have occurred by similar market.143 The same infrastructure 
can occasionally be used for two markets supplying different but similar 
products on the same geographical market.144   
The first example was in the judgment of Deutsche Post establishing that 
the undertaking was a multi-product firm145 that could use the synergies of 
different markets to lower the prices in other markets.146  
Deutsche Post was enjoying a monopoly in the letter-post market, which to 
some extent financed the commercial parcel market.147 This allowed 
Deutsche Post to lower the price level to below ATC. This was concluded to 
be abusive. In Post Danmark the average incremental costs were defined as 
‘those costs destined to disappear in the short or medium term (three to five 
years), if Post Danmark were to give up its business activity of distributing 
unaddressed mail’148. Post Danmark used the infrastructure from the 
unaddressed mail market and created synergies with the universal obligation 
for certain addressed items of mail.149 The possibility for Post Danmark to 
decrease its costs is made by the ‘great bulk’ concept taking into 
consideration the whole company’s costs. The common variable costs have 
the same distribution channels as the distribution of unaddressed mail and 
the universal obligation for certain addressed items of mail.150 
 
 
3.1.10  Legal Assessment of AIC  
 
                                                
142 ‘The cost calculated by dividing all its long-run incremental costs by its output. LRAIC 
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CJEU is explaining the fact behind the conclusion of the case, discussing the 
moderated AKZO-tests and its application to this specific judgment. The 
classical Areeda-Turner test is not used, as marginal cost is not applicable in 
this present case. AVC is not used as Post Danmark is currently operating 
on several markets in the postal sector on the Danish market.151 Post 
Danmark were a natural monopoly and has therefore the necessary 
infrastructure in order to be able to compete efficiently on the market.  
 
In other words, to make a necessary analysis of the upcoming situation the 
CJEU must assess the concept of average incremental cost in accordance 
with Post Danmark’s legal situation. The court stated that the AIC are the 
costs that are destined to disappear in the short or medium term, between 
three to five year, if Post Danmark were to give up its business activity 
distributing unaddressed mail.152 The ATC were the costs made up by the 
AIC and the common cost anticipated from the activities other than those 
covered by the universal service obligation.153 The Danish Government held 
that costs both in the universal service obligation and the services for 
unaddressed mail were intertwined.154 Both the staff and the infrastructure 
were seen as the common cost as it were used for both product markets. The 
common costs were seen as being the AIC and could be interpreted as being 
the AVC. The ‘common costs’ were calculated to be 75% of the all costs 
and 25% were seen as being the non-attributable common costs.155 The 
court did therefore provide the bulk cost test through the ‘as-efficient 
competitor’ test.  
 
The price level given to the Coop group, one of the Forburger-Kontakt’s 
customers, was held between the AIC and ATC. As the effect-based 
approach was used through the ‘as efficient competitor’- test the anti-
competitive behaviour was assessed through the concept of the actual or 
likely effect, which could lead to an exclusionary effect that will affect 
consumer welfare.156 The fact that the court is looking at the effects shows 
that LRAIC is not enough to foreclose an ‘as efficient competitor’.157 The 
fact that both price levels for Spar and SuperBest were held higher than 
ATC shows the lack of of predatory pricing.158 The price level for Coop was 
held in between ATC and LRAIC, which could not be seen as being 
exclusionary.159 The ‘as-efficient competitor’ will be able to compete with 
these prices without suffering unsustainable in the long-run.160 When 
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pricing between ATC and LRAIC the focus lies in proving intent. The 
evidence put forward was not sufficient to establish that Post Danmark had 
the intent to force competitor out of the market. As this was not established 
and Forbruger-Kontakt was able to stay on the market and at a later stage 
retrieve former customer showed that the behaviour was not actual abusive. 
If recoupment was used to prove abuse Post Danmark could not be seen as 
abusive as Forbruger-Kontakt was not foreclosed. Post Danmark behaviour 
can be seen as lawful and thus within the boarders of competition on the 
merit as the pricing strategy was not seen as being abusive or had the intent 
to eliminate a competitor.161 Intent is not always needed when claiming that 
there is an abuse as long as there is proof of anti-competitive effects.162 The 
above-mentioned fact did not lead to that F-K lost distribution network 
necessary to compete but lost market share in the short-run but managed to 
win back Coop group in 2007 and Spar.  
 
 
3.1.11  Analysis  
One can argue that Post Danmark’s conduct to lower prices is dishonest as it 
was managed by the infrastructure created when Danish Government owned 
the undertaking from the time when Post Danmark was a natural monopoly 
on the postal service market. The infrastructure and the market share must 
show that Post Danmark have a vast advantage on the market for 
unaddressed mail in comparison to new entries and one can argue that the 
special responsibility doctrine can be applicable. One might even argue that 
the established market structures held by a former natural monopoly should 
not take advantages of this in unreasonable way according to competition. 
To allow all new entries to enjoy the benefit of the already established 
infrastructure would balance the competition on the market. The situation of 
a former natural monopoly could be assessed through the concept of super-
dominance but lacks the market share necessary. On the other hand the 
principle of equal treatment should be applicable to all companies and in 
comparison between undertakings. But with the AIC then Post Danmark can 
take losses in one business area and make a profit in orders and still be able 
to foreclose competition.   
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4 The ’As-Efficient Competitors’ 
-Test 
4.1 Introduction and Description of the ’As-
Efficient Competitor’- Test 
This section will look more closely on the test used in the Post Danmark 
judgment, assess the legal aspect of the test and try to analyse what 
consequences may arise with the application of this test.  
 
Markets are seldom identical and competition may in some markets be 
preformed with price competition. In some market competitors have to be 
efficient to survive and in some don’t. The ‘as-efficient competitor’-test is 
applicable on market where competitors are optimally cost-efficient.163 The 
‘as-efficient competitor’-test is a test to indicate if anticompetitive 
behaviour exist by looking at a hypothetical competitor costs.164 This test 
has been used in American antitrust case law165 and created by Richard 
Posner. The European way of applying the test is by first looking if the 
dominant undertaking is competing on its merits. If answered no to this 
question, the test will be applicable. 
 
Price competition is suggested to have positive effects on competition, as it 
will decrease prices for consumers hence increasing consumer welfare. Price 
competition is also one of the competitions on the merits conditions.166 But 
price strategies can have negative effects on the market. The Commission 
will intervene when the ‘conduct concerned has already been or is capable 
of hampering competition from competitors which are considered to be as 
efficient as the dominant undertaking’167. Sometimes even a less efficient 
competitor with ‘demand-related advantages, such as network and learning 
effects’168 must be taken into consideration as this may lead to efficiency 
gains later on.169 Another example is when a dominant undertaking might 
have been enjoying economies of scale or scope, learning curves or first 
mover advantages170 as this may lead to the fact that smaller companies 
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have no possibility to stay on the market. The Commission will take into 
account the market context in every investigation.171 The test should in 
principle exclude less efficient competitor, as its prices are held too high. 
Doctrine claims that these companies should not per se be considered in the 
test172 and that competition law should not protect these companies.173 But 
the test is flawed when there no ability to compare between companies that 
have different market share and different price levels on the market.174   
 
The data that the Commission will first assess is the related cost and sales 
prices from the dominant undertaking. If this is not available then the ‘as-
efficient competitor’-test will be used taken the data from an apparently 
efficient competitor.175 If this information is not attainable the Commission 
must first prove that abuse exist and then the burden of proof will be put on 
the dominant undertaking to show that the costs and pricing is held at an 
appropriate level.176  
 
If relevant information can be retrieved from the dominant undertaking it 
will be utilized but if the data concerning cost is not available then it will be 
achieved from competitors or others.177 The Commission has stated that the 
costs will be investigated through average avoidable cost (AAC) and long-
run average incremental cost (LRAIC). Average avoidable cost is to be 
interpreted as being the average variable cost. When the dominant 
undertaking and the as efficient competitor are not able to cover its costs the 
dominant undertaking is sacrificing profit. The ‘as-efficient competitor’ will 
not be able to cover its costs in the short-run.  
 
If the ‘as-efficient competitor’ is able to compete without being foreclosed 
and there is no decrease in consumer benefit based on the relevant data 
collected by the Commission, the Commission will not suggest that the 
price conduct is unlawful and thus not intervene. The dominant undertaking 
has now received the label of ‘safe harbour’ showing that the conduct will 
not lead to any foreclosure when adopted to the price scheme.178 This test is 
hard to apply in practise, as it is hard to retrieve information from the 
dominant undertaking as in some countries this information is protected by 
law.179 
 
If the conduct forces the competitors out of the market the Commission will 
make a general assessment of anti-competitive foreclosure but also take into 
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consideration other relevant quantitative and/or qualitative evidence180 such 
as price schedule and rebate system.181 Sometimes the Commission also 
look at the incremental costs as sometimes other markets are affected by the 
behaviour.182  
 
 
4.1.1 Legal Assessment of the ‘As-Efficient 
Competitor’-Test in Post Danmark 
CJEU came to the conclusion that Post Danmark had not used predatory 
pricing to force the competitors out of the market as the ‘as-efficient 
competitor’-test was used and evaluated the situation. Forbruger-Kontakt 
was not foreclosed and it was even able to retrieve the costumers that were 
lost to Post Danmark. The losses made by Forbruger-Kontakt showed that 
the conduct was not unsustainable in the short-run but the effects were 
likely to occur. But the test should be used when  
‘article 82 EC prohibits a dominant undertaking from, among other 
things, adopting pricing practices that have an exclusionary effect on 
competitors considered to be as efficient as it is itself and 
strengthening its dominant position by using methods other than those 
that are part of competition on the merits.’183 
 
Richard Posner claims that prices below cost are a conduct that will 
foreclose an ‘as-efficient competitors’ but that there lies difficulties in 
proving this fact.184 Posner criticised the test of being flawed as only one 
example can provide evidence that the test works. This example is 
illustrated when a quasi-monopoly lowers its prices to ATC and the 
competitor is unable to compete.185 The test has also a hard time taken into 
consideration economies of scale if the as efficient competitor is not also 
enjoying the same bulk costs.186  
 
Another critic of the ‘as-efficient competitor’-test is that is does not consider 
consumer harm.187 This is one of two important criteria when assessing if 
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behaviour has objective justifications. The other criterion concerns the 
concept of efficiencies. This will be further discussed in Section 7.2 on 
Objective justifications. Professor Salop was also in line with the consumer 
critic claiming that the test is too focused on the competitor instead of the 
consumers.188 Professor Hovenkamp, on the other hand found that the test is 
being precise to the matter of predatory pricing and is giving a safe path for 
dominant undertakings that is enjoying economies of scale.189 When seeing 
to the judgment the test was used too broadly.190 But the test is giving 
advantages in comparison to other tests and especially the form-based 
approach as it gives a ‘stringency and predictability’.191 The test had on the 
other hand a hard time to taken into considerations economies of scale as 
new entries cannot be able to compete with the dominant undertaking when 
there are high fixed costs on the market.192 This is why the great bulk test 
was used in the judgment. Prices above average incremental cost will allow 
as efficient competitor to be able to compete and therefore the Commission 
will not intervene. But in this specific case Post Danmark vended a multiple 
of products enjoying economies of scale with significant common cost.  
These facts must be assessed to see if the as efficient competitor is 
foreclosed.193 This conduct might also lead to consumer harm and is 
therefore looked upon as important.194 If so, an effect-based test will be 
preformed and establishes if effect exist when prices are held below ATC 
but above LRAIC. The court has then confirmed the test stated in the 
guidance paper.195  
 
 
4.1.2 Analysis  
It is obvious that doctrine is not in consensus if the ‘as-efficient 
competitors’-test should be used concerning predatory pricing. It is clear 
from the doctrine although that this test is more appropriate as this will lead 
to the most accurate investigation of a dominant undertaking applying prices 
that can be seen as abusive. One can argue that this test should be used and 
was used when Post Danmark managed to strengthen its position on the 
market by behaviour unfamiliar of the competition on the merits. 
 
                                                
188 Moreira Mateus, Abel, Coelho Moreira, Competition Law and Economics: Advances in 
Competition Policy Enforcement in the EU and North America, Edward Elgar Publishing, 
Northampton, USA, 2010, p. 210. 
189 Ibid, p. 209. 
190 Mandorff, Martin, Sahl, Johan, The Role of the ’Equally Efficient Competitor’ in the 
Assessment of Abuse of Dominance, Working Paper 2013:1, Swedish Competition 
Authority, p. 13.  
191 Ibid, p. 18. 
192 Marty, Frédéric, As-Efficient Competitor Test in Exclusionary Prices Strategies: Does 
Post-Danmark Really Pave the Way towards a More Economic Approach?, p. 15. 
193 Rousseva, Ekaterina, Marquis, Mel, Hell Freezes Over: A Climate Change for Assessing 
Exclusionary Conduct under Article 102 TFEU, p. 6. 
194 Ibid, p. 7. 
195 Ibid, p. 7. 
37 
 
 
The lack of competing tests gives the ‘as-efficient competitor’-test an 
advantage. This approach made by the CJEU is clearly a step towards a 
more economical approach providing more legal certainty. But what will 
happened if the dominant undertaking will not give information about their 
costs and price level to the Commission and the Commission will not be 
able to provide sufficient evidence proving abusive behaviour? This test will 
only be applicable with help outside of the Commission and the test requires 
counter-performance. If the dominant undertaking is enjoying economies of 
scale and foreclosing the as-efficient competitor the test is not applicable as 
the ‘know-how’ will not be attained. The ‘safe harbour’ concept can be 
misinterpreted to include all types of abusive behaviour. The test will on the 
other hand be developed in future EU case law and be applicable in future 
judgments. The test is although a hypothetical test and should be applied in 
the same way.  
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5 Pricing Above Average Total 
Cost 
5.1 Selective Pricing  
5.1.1 Introduction 
As Chapter 3 has described and analysed the abuse when pricing below 
average total cost, the abusive effect might be established even if prices are 
held above average total cost. This chapter will introduce the concept, 
present relevant case law, assess the concept and finish this of with an 
attempted analysis.  
Selective pricing is essentially a strategy through, which a dominant 
undertaking tries to steal customer from their rival companies through 
differentiated pricing. By applying different prices to the same product the 
dominant will try to out-compete its rival for customers through lower 
prices while making up for the lost profits in other markets.196 Since the 
price remains above the average total cost, the abusive conduct arises from 
the preferred treatment of on customer segment to detriment to other 
customers.197 Recall that Article 102 (c) lists the application of dissimilar 
condition to equivalent transactions as a type of abuse inconsistent with 
Union law. If the conduct has the ability to foreclose the consumer or affect 
consumer harm negatively it must be seen as discriminatory.198 But 
according to the concept of predatory pricing prices held above average total 
costs should not be seen as abusive. But exceptional circumstances might 
indicate that such a price lead to consumer harm.199  
5.1.2 Case law Concerning Selectively Low 
Pricing  
5.1.2.1 Hilti200  
The Hilti judgment involved a company, Hilti, which produced nails and 
nail guns. Faced with increasing competition, Hilti tried to capute its 
competitor’s customers through lower prices: sometimes even giving away 
its products free of charge.201 The Commission came to the conclusion that 
this was unlawful behaviour since the conditions applied by Hilti were 
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selective and discriminatory. The customers that were already buying from 
Hilti was seen as being discriminated against and were bearing the cost of 
the new customers with reduced price.202 Can Hilti be applicable to the 
average incremental cost test as Hilti were competiting on two markets 
selling the nails at a level that was below average total cost and even giving 
away the product for free? We will never know as the economical approach 
was not used but the effect-based approach was concentrating on tying.  
5.1.2.2 Irish Sugar v Commission203  
 
Irish Sugar plc supplied sugar to customers on the Irish market granting 
selective low pricing discounts to a few companies near Irelands and the 
boarders of Northern Ireland. This behaviour held prohibited elements 
according to article 86 (c) EC as the foreclosure effects would occur. The 
General Court came to the conclusion that Irish Sugars behaviour fell within 
the prohibited behaviour of selective low pricing. The intent to force 
competition out of the market was suspected to have existed as alleged 
effects could be proven to appear. The rebates given to a few customers 
were financed by higher prices in other regions of the country. Consumers 
had not received the benefit of low prices and no economical efficiencies 
were recognized. The necessity to show foreclosure is not mandatory but 
illustrate that the rebates used could have actual foreclosing effects.204 The 
condition in the case concerning dominant market share is essential in the 
finding abuse of dominant position. The criterion of super-dominant applied 
to the situation and are not uncommon in case law concerning selective 
prices above costs.205  
5.1.3 The Concept of Fighting Ship 
The concept of fighting ship means to work above average total cost and 
without price competition. By choosing the same routes as the competitor, 
with lower prices that small undertaking don’t have the ability to compete 
with will lead to foreclosure. This behaviour can both be seen as abusive 
and applicable to article 101 and article 102 TFEU. The assessment of 
article 101 TFEU is within the limitation and will not be discussed further. 
With the use of a liner conference the number of competing vessels increase 
with the co-operation. The fighting ship will take all the same routes and 
from the same ports as the non-member is taken in order to steal the rivals 
customers.206 The prices for the linear conference competing with the non-
member are an important factor. The prices are set at the same level or 
lower even as the competitor, even if the conference decreases its profit. The 
costs and losses of profit of each vessel competing with the non-linear 
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conference member is divided between all the members. As the non-
member is enjoying bigger losses companies fighting in than the conference 
the possibility to compete are low or even non-existent. The concept of 
fighting ship is based on a collective dominant position using selecting low 
prices for the competitor’s customers.207 This was highlighted in the below 
judgment.  
 
5.1.3.1 Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports and 
Others v Commission208 
The Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports and Others v Commission 
judgment highlighting the concept of fighting ship for the first time. 
Compagnie Maritime Belge Transport was one of the members in the liner 
conference Associated Central West Africa Lines, also known as CEWAL, 
competing unlawfully according to the concept against G&C. The 
conferences members departed the same time as G&C but with lower fees in 
order to increase demand for its product.  The concept can be explained as, 
when a member closest to the schedule act, change rates in order to have a 
competitive advantage against competition and the competitors customers, 
this would leads to a loss of profit which members split between them.209  
The difference between predatory pricing and fighting ship is that the latter 
does not set prices below costs. As the Commission did not see a revenue 
loss it instead focus on the question of intent in its decision210 as obviously 
existed with the plan to eliminate a competitor.211  
The application of the intent was important, to say the least, as the AKZO 
test was not applicable due to the fact that there were only prices above 
average total cost. This tactic differed from the AKZO judgment in that there 
were costs below ATC and sometimes AVC in AKZO but as CEWAL had 
costs above ATC no sacrifice was made, only loss of revenue. CEWAL on 
the other hand, appeal to the fact that prices could not be seen as prohibited 
according to article 102 TFEU as the price level was held above average 
total cost.212 However, the use of rates/fees clearly proved that intent existed 
to eliminate a competitor. The use of selective pricing and lower prices for 
some targeted customer showed a strategy of unfair competition.213 The fact 
that the group were trying to eliminate a competitor will in the extension 
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have the capacity of affect the trade between Member states.214 The CJEU 
concluded that this behaviour could not be rendered legitimate 
competition.215 CEWAL even disposed meetings with the conference 
members named Special Fighting Committee in which oversaw the practices 
of the alleged abuse.216  
 
The Commission argued on the fact that selectively low fees had negative 
effects on competition.217 The stolen customers were likely to be given 
lower rates then regular customers that were only offered normal or higher 
rates. This conduct provided prohibited price discriminated. The 
Commission claim in its decision that the fighting ship practice could not be 
a reasonable and proportionate response to a new competitor as the possible 
effects were evaluated. The conduct should only have the capacity to have 
such an effect on competition.218 CEWAL was seen as using a behaviour 
prohibited according to the article 102 TFEU.  CEWAL works on a special 
market and one can argue that these specific circumstances are not 
applicable to other markets or situations.  
 
 
 
5.1.4 Legal Assessment of the Concept of 
Pricing Above Average Total Cost  
The concept of super-dominance was established in both in the CEWAL and 
Irish Sugar judgments. In both judgments the companies held market share 
above the threshold of super-dominance even close to the fact of monopoly-
power.219 CEWAL enjoyed a market share of 90% on the relevant market220 
and Irish Sugar held an even greater market share of 95% on the relevant 
market.221 Is the element of super-dominance lowering the threshold for 
abuse? One can argue that this should not affect what is prohibited conduct 
according to article 102 TFEU but thought the court.222 As predatory pricing 
is only applicable to pricing held below cost, price discrimination was 
                                                
214 Case T-24/93 Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports v. Commission, para. 203.  
215 Case C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports and others v 
Commission, para. 96-97.  
216 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Fennelly in Case 395/96 and 396/96 Compagnie 
Maritime Belge Transports SA, para. 93.   
217 Pozdnakova, Alla, Linear Shipping and EU Competition Law, p. 358.  
218 Case T-24/93 Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports v. Commission, para. 201. 
219 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Fennelly in Case 395/96 and 396/96 Compagnie 
Maritime Belge Transports SA, para. 137.  
220 Case C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports and others v 
Commission, para. 119. 
221 Commission fines IRISH SUGAR for abuse of its dominant position on the Irish sugar 
market, Brussels, 14 May 1997, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/closed/1997/en/ip97405.html, accessed 25 May 
2014.  
222 Jones, Alison, Sufrin, Brenda, EC Competition Law, Text, Cases, And Materials, p. 420-
421.  
42 
 
 
applied. The application of price discrimination, the high market share and 
taking into account all the circumstances negative effects on the market may 
be seen. So is the super-dominance criterion necessary when finding abuse 
in selective low pricing schemes?  
 
As stated above Post Danmark held a market share of 44-47%, which could 
not be seen as being super-dominant and could therefore not fit under the 
concept.223 But if all prices levels, offered to customers, would have been 
above average total could the selective low pricing concept be applicable? 
One can argue against the fact, as only less efficient competitors would be 
foreclosed.224 However, the behaviour made by CEWAL was founded to be 
applicable to the concept of collective dominance and Irish Sugar was 
founded to have several abuses.225 The fact that the court in Post Danmark 
did not even mentioned the Irish Sugar judgment and CEWAL judgment 
must be a hint that these cases were not applicable.226  
 
But what happens in this scenario when the competition is showing the price 
level at average total cost but the dominant undertaking is having lower 
prices but still working on ATC? The only possibility to provide proof that 
the dominant undertaking is not working below cost is to show it’s cost and 
revenue situation.227 But the undertaking could argue economies of scale. 
Economies of scale hinder market entry, as not entry is able to compete with 
the price level applied by the undertaking.  The above stated price level may 
be exempted conduct as no abusive behaviour has occurred.  
 
Can economies of scale and intent to foreclose competitors out of the 
market is applicable at the same time? It is impossible for the dominant 
undertaking to know if its price level is below the ATC of the competitors 
price level228 as the safe harbour concept might be applicable.  In CEWAL, 
G&C had actually increased its market share as the abusive effect was 
evident to the Commission, but this was not seen as a remissive ground.229 
G&C could potentially increased it’s market share more significant if the 
abuse had not been preformed by CEWAL.230  
 
The Advocate General, in the judgment of Post Danmark, concluded, that 
prices that are given to different customers, no matter customer, and that 
prices above average total cost could not force an equally efficient 
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competitor out of the market. If the competitor has higher costs than the 
dominant undertaking then the ‘equally-efficient competitor’ concept is not 
applicable but there will be a test according to competition on the merits.231 
Although the behaviour can change the structure of competition on the 
market232, price discrimination will not always lead to negative effects.  The 
pros and cons of Price Discrimination will be further discussed in the 
Chapter 6.   
5.1.5 Analysis  
 
The collection of dominant undertakings in the CEWAL judgment did not 
enjoy economies of scale, as the costs were not shared but only the losses of 
profit. This fact allowed G&C to compete with the price level applied on the 
market before the abusive behaviour started. The fact that CEWAL was 
having such a high market share should allow the threshold for abusive 
behaviour to be relatively low. The doctrine of special responsibility will be 
further discussed in chapter 7.3. It is shown in this case of collective 
dominance that all the undertakings were having equal costs, as G&C were 
able to compete effectively on the market. The fact that G&C were able to 
increase its market share although the market was influenced by abuse 
shows that the concept of fighting ship is flawed. One can argue that the 
concept only provides a safety net for competitor on the market.  
 
Selective low pricing should not be seen as an abuse when the price level is 
held above average total cost as if the dominant undertaking(s) is competing 
through pricing strategies it should be seen as being competing fairly with 
price competition. The fact that CEWAL could lower its prices and still 
enjoy prices above average total cost shows that it is the consumers that are 
affected on this specific market. Consumer welfare will eventually be 
decreased. As the fixed cost on this market are high in few competitors will 
be able put in the sunk cost and compete on the market. The risk is too high 
in comparison to the fixed costs.  
 
The super dominant undertaking Irish Sugar held a quasi-monopolistic 
market share on the Irish market for sugar. As the company provided rebates 
to a few by managing to finance this with higher prices for the rest would 
effect the market. As a market share reaches over 70% of a special 
responsibility to compete with quality is applied. Irish Sugar was seen as a 
too large undertaking to be granted the behaviour of selective low pricing.  
 
When looking at the Hilti judgment, Hilti supplied product to a very low 
price and sometimes even for free. The fact that the nails were tied to the 
machine and the nails were given to a low price could not only be seen as 
unlawful. The prices set by Hilti were sometimes not only seen as selective 
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low but also predatory which very often is seen as abusive. The Court did 
not even look at the consumer welfare or efficiencies that could arise.  
 
As there were no desired effects seen in Irish Sugar and CMBT, intent was 
established through the companies’ internal documentation. The price level 
applicable on both markets must show that the price competition should be 
interpreted strictly in Union’s competition law. But selective pricing might 
lead to consumer welfare, as price discrimination will allow more 
consumers to be able to experience the product. The concept will lead to a 
change in market shares but the positive effects might outweigh the negative 
effects. One can argue this in the CEWAL judgment as more consumers will 
be able to afford the product and G&C actually increased its market share. 
G&C might even be able to state that it is more market friendly as it is 
currently being foreclosed on the relevant market, as consumers will be 
more inclined to buy services from them.   
An output increase is a likely effect of price discrimination as different 
customers have different price elasticity of demand. More customers will 
enjoy the product and only shift market share in the short run. This was seen 
in the Post Danmark judgment were Forbruger-Kontakt lost Coop, 
SuperBest and Spar but managed to retrieve Coop and Spar a few years 
later.233   
Thus, an effect of increasing output is the ability to find economies of scale. 
This will also allow lower uniform price and increase consumer welfare, 
which will benefit the whole market as more customers can enjoy the 
products. Economists have generally seen this as creation of efficiencies.  
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6 Price Discrimination  
6.1 Introduction to the Concept of Price 
Discrimination   
Price discrimination is a conduct that can both be seen as hinding and 
enhancing the competition. A discussed will be held in this chapter if Post 
Danmark’s conduct concerning selectively low pricing is seen as 
discriminatory according to price. The concept will be introduced, linked to 
the judgment and analysed. The conduct of price discrimination concerned 
focuses on the market situation where Forbruger-Kontakt were 
discriminated as a rival and where customers, to both Forbruger-Kontakt 
and Post Danmark, were price discriminated between them.  
 
The conduct of discriminatory pricing falls under article 102 TFEU. CJEU 
has developed its case law from 1960’s to include price discrimination in 
the following wording found in subparagraph (c) ‘applying dissimilar 
conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage;’234. According to Professor 
Richard Posner, price discrimination is  
price discrimination is a term that economists use to describe the 
practice of selling the same product to different customers at different 
prices even though the cost of sale is the same to each of them. More 
precisely, it is selling at a price or prices such that the ratio of price to 
marginal costs is different in different sales.235 
But instead the CJEU created criteria to be fulfilled for better interpretation 
of the abuse of price discrimination. CJEU has established in case law that 
price discriminatory have effects of foreclosure if the undertaking applying 
the prices are dominant on the relevant market. Dominant position must be 
applied collectively.  
 
This increases the burden of proof to the application of price 
discrimination.236 The principles of equality and fair treatment will not 
suffice for applying price discrimination.237 Customers, in practise, have 
imperfect information of the market and therefore the dominant undertaking 
has the ability to price discriminate. If the customers have more information 
arbitration will be applicable and price discrimination will not be.238 The 
effect is not necessarily needed in determining the abuse. Deffernetiated 
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pricing in different Member States may also obstruct the development of the 
interal market.239 The aim and understanding of the paragraph c in article 
102 TFEU is that consumers240 and the function of the market241 should be 
protected. However, when looking at the effect the necessity to use economic 
theories so that both the consumers and the firm can benefit from price 
discrimination should exist.242 Effect must not be established when determining 
price discrimination.243 
 
As exclusion should be hindered under article 102 TFEU entry possibilities 
must be assessed properly. The main purpose of evaluating price 
discrimination is to see if there are less products sold or if there are any 
efficiency gains. Taking away price discrimination can lead to the fact that 
‘upstream companies’244 refuses to have ‘selectively price cuts’245. Another 
consequence of price discrimination is the fact that consumers with lower 
incomes have the possibility to buy goods that are usually on a higher price 
level. Price discrimination should be assessed according to the purpose of 
efficiencies, higher outputs and consumer welfares.  
 
The threshold for showing effect built from price discrimination is high. The 
CJEU clarified that the price discrimination must show an actual distorting 
of the competition.246 This distortion must be significant.247 In order to 
prove price discrimination, discrimination must affect the costs or revenue 
significantly, cost or price changes affect price, output and innovation or 
that there are negative effects on production or dynamic efficiencies of some 
undertakings.248  
 
 
 
 
6.1.1 Legal Assessment of Price Discrimination  
Criteria needed in determining price discrimination are that trading partners are 
affected, that they compete with each other and that disadvantage occurs.249 
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Anne Perrot thinks that the European Competition Authority has not used these 
criteria properly as the one can conclude that case law is easily applicable.250  
 
The Competition authorizes must analyse the allegedly harmful situation 
thoroughly in order to evaluate the potential anti-competitive effect. This 
entails an assessment of the market structure and outlining the competitors’ 
need, not only output and consumer welfare. The need for a case-by-case 
evaluation and an assessment of all details is of outmost importance.251 Post 
Danmark’s  
 
pricing policy in issue in the main proceedings, (can) be described as 
“price discrimination” that is to say, charging different customers or 
different classes of customers different prices for goods or services 
whose costs are the same or, conversely, charging a single price to 
customers for whom supply costs differ, cannot of itself suggest that 
there exists an exclusionary abuse.252  
 
Price discrimination was not assessed according to the effect as the court 
only concluded that the different prices were insufficient in proving effects. 
The exact boundaries of the anti-competitive test concerning price 
discrimination will certainly be at the center of considerable future 
litigation. The secondary-line discrimination was already established on a 
domestic level and hence not evaluated here. David Spector confirms this 
view when discussing that Competition authorities need not to see price 
discrimination as a separate offence in order to minimize the existence of 
false positives.253  
 
If the Commission has concluded abusive effects these can be justified with, 
as stated above, efficiencies and welfares. If more customers have the 
possibility to purchase a greater output and choice is attained as this product 
would otherwise not be offered to these customers.254  
 
In the short-run the companies are gaining profit when using price 
discrimination, something that differs from other types of abuse where 
companies giving up profit in rebates, discounts and tying & bundling 
situation. Seeing to the increase in welfare, as output increases, customers 
that are not willing to buy products under the uniform price now has the 
possibility to a lower price.  
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Discrimination will shift market share between competitors in the short-
run.255 Price at a higher level will allow fewer customers to enjoy the 
product and the undertaking will not increase output thereby selling more.256 
When having prices above price equilibrium on the market this should be a 
signal for market entry.   
 
In this sense even a less efficient competitor can be able to exist and provide 
low competition market. In the extension, this will lead to less competition 
and not benefitting the consumers, as there will be no willingness to push 
prices.257 Therefore is the selective low pricing that is something that will 
benefit the consumer, as more customers will be able to buy the product. 
 
Price discrimination may lead to the effect of market foreclosure, as rivals 
are not able to compete on the price level. This is exclusionary conduct as 
output and consumer welfare decreases.258 But as every customer has 
different demand for the product there should be different prices.  
 
6.1.2 Analysis 
The fact that the court showed that a test of anti-competitive price 
discrimination must be applied to show effect of the conduct opens up for 
the positive effects of price discrimination. Positive effect arising from price 
discriminate, are greater output and in the extension the ability to decrease 
prices via economies of scale if discriminating optimally. These additional 
investments can be made when selling more units.  
 
Retailers receiving different prices vertically in the chain will force price 
down allowing consumers to benefit from lower price. Competition will 
increase with price discrimination, as every customer is important to work 
for. Instead of having higher overall costs prices can be lower for some 
customers increase the competitive environment. When selectively having 
lower costs for rivals customers and higher for new customers a more 
dynamic competition market has been created. The comfort level will be 
lower but the price is providing end-customer the more benefit. To 
conclude, the new approach to price discrimination will enhance 
competition.  
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7 Justifications 
7.1 Introduction of the chapter  
Chapter 7 will introduce justification, when the Commission has established 
abusive effects. The concept of objective justification and the doctrine of 
Special responsibility will be introduced and analysed in accordance to the 
judgment of Post Danmark. Objective justifications are seen to outweigh the 
negative effects of abuse and the special responsibility of dominant 
undertakings applies special conduct undertakings enjoying a larger market 
share.  
7.2 Objective Justification  
Article 102 TFEU does not contain a specific provision concerning 
objectives to justify the dominant undertakings behaviour but has been 
provided by the Commission in the Guidance enforcement priorities and in 
DG Competition Discussion paper.259 An abusive conduct, by a dominant 
undertaking, that is not caught by the concept of competition on the merits 
must provide evidence of efficiencies.260 The behaviour is presumed to be 
abusive and then the burden of proof lies on the dominant undertaking to 
prove that there are objective justifications.261 When abuse has been 
concluded the dominant undertaking has the ability to show that the alleged 
behaviour is justified by some objective criteria.262 The two applicable 
defences are ‘objective necessity defence’ and ‘meeting competition 
defence’.263 As the dominant firm has to prove that the behaviour is 
‘objectively necessary’, or that the behaviour is producing ‘substantial 
efficiencies that outweighs any anti-competitive effects on consumers’264.  
 
When the claim has been put forward by the dominant firm the Commission 
looks at the claim through the criterion of indispensablity and the safety 
standard concerning necessity and proportionate265 when looking at the 
meeting competition defence.266  
  
The dominant undertaking has the ability to provide proof of efficiencies to 
show that consumer’s welfare is not damaged. The four criteria are 
collectively needed in proving benefits for the consumers steaming from 
ideas of technical improvements, the conduct is need to meet this goal, the 
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upside is greater than the downside of the behaviour and the behaviour does 
not exclude effective competition such as innovation. When fulfilling the 
criteria mentioned above it is essential, according to the Commission, that 
the dominant firm does not maintains, creates or strengthens its dominant 
position.267 The Commission will in the light of consumer harm ultimately 
evaluates the criteria put forward by the dominant undertaking.268 This 
essentially means that the dominant undertaking has a better and cheaper 
product than the competitors.269 
 
These criteria must also be proven to be indispensible for goal of 
efficiencies. To prove indispensability, criteria like realistic and attainable 
alternatives must be met. The undertaking must also prove that this is the 
only way to attain these goals.270 
 
What are the obligatory criteria? In the necessary criteria there must be a 
connection between the product and public health or safety.271 In the 
judgment of Tetra Pak272 the integrated system of cartons was made for 
public healthy issues. The General court claimed that it is not up to Tetra 
Pak to decide what is to be included in these criteria by excluding 
competitors that has unsafe products regulations. Tetra Pak must consulting 
public authorities hence provide permission.273 The court does not 
appreciate the initiative.274 The possibility to justify its abusive behaviour is 
thin.  
 
In the judgment of Microsoft275, Microsoft’s could also not justify its 
conduct. Microsoft was force to share its R&D as the effects of its 
behaviour was seen as being foreclosing. This objection was not justified as 
the Commission looked at the whole market for this service and came to the 
conclusion that the innovation did not have the positive effect to justify 
Microsoft behaviour.276  
7.2.1 Objective Justification According to Post 
Danmark  
The Court makes no investigation of Post Danmark is in fact guilty of the 
charges made in the judgment but states the objective justification can be 
applied if effects are found. There is a premise built into the concept, that 
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dominant undertakings in an abusive position might utilize justification if 
necessary.277 The effect for consumers cannot be detrimental if not 
justification can not be found.278  
 
When the objective justification is applied the need to prove innocence does 
not exist only the possibility to show that justification to the behaviour 
under article 102 TFEU. The behaviour must be proven to be objectively 
necessary, counterbalance or outweighing the abuse in terms of 
efficiencies279 by the dominant undertaking.280 The dominant undertaking 
must prove that there are efficiencies gains and that effective competition is 
not eliminated.281 In the extension consumer interest should be directly 
protected and the CJEU explains that it will follow the Commissions path 
explaining that consumers benefit should be ensured.282 
 
7.2.2 Analysis 
The burden is first put on the Commission to show that there are negative 
effects arising from the conduct by the undertaking then the burden is 
transformed on to the defendant that must prove that the conduct has 
efficiency gains for the market. The conduct shown must in the extension 
also benefit consumers. The CJEU claim that the conduct must counteract 
abusive effects with efficiencies. This is a fact that is bit different from the 
guidance paper, which states that the efficiencies must outweigh the abusive 
behaviour. The Court set the threshold of counterbalance and not necessarily 
to outweigh the negative aspects. An important fact to take into 
consideration is the position of the consumers that should remain in tact.  
 
7.3 Special Responsibility  
To have a special responsibly is quite common for companies in a dominant 
position and especially for former legal monopolies.283 The definition284 is 
vague at best but make companies more watchful of its conduct.285 The 
responsibility for the dominant undertaking is to make sure that its 
behaviour is neither impairing genuine nor distortion of competition on the 
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internal market.286  
Dominant undertaking with a large market share has an extra responsibility 
applied to its conduct. The concept of special responsibility came from the 
concept that undertakings should apply a higher performance standard, 
arising from German Competition law and the GWB provisions of abuse.287 
Professor Ulmer at the University of Heidelberg claimed that there should 
be tests discussing if the undertaking used non-performance competition and 
that the performance is restricting the competitive environment on the 
market. The non-performance competition has though not been defined.288 
The concept was alternated but the content was used again. In the judgment 
of Michelin the doctrine was declaring of how Michelin should act, as there 
is complete competition on the market.289 This concept does not concern the 
dominance per se but how the dominant undertaking should act.290 The 
active performance by a dominant undertaking should not make entry harder 
for companies except if the undertaking is enjoying objective justification 
through legitimate efficiencies.291 This doctrine should work as a way to 
protect the consumer and to maintain direct welfare.292 The undertaking 
should ask as to distinguish between abusive and legitimate market 
behaviour.293 The dominant undertaking must therefore balance its profit 
with the consumer’s interest.294 The specific definition takes into account 
the case by case approach as every infringement situation ‘show a weakened 
competitive situation’295. 
When present on a weak market and holding a dominant position the 
concept of special responsibility must be taken into account. All facts must 
be considered in the light of specific circumstances of each case i.e. the 
larger the market share the greater responsibility is held by the dominant 
undertaking.296  
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7.3.1 Legal Assessment of Special 
Responsiblity 
Irish Sugar and CEWAL enjoyed a quasi-monopolistic market share.297 The 
doctrine is proportionate in the sense that larger market share will force a 
higher responsibility on the conduct made by the dominant undertaking. In 
both these specific case the undertakings were seen as being abusive 
according to the concept of selective low pricing which is hard to apply as 
this threshold is put relatively high. In contrast with these judgments Post 
Danmark was barely able to fit into the threshold of a dominant position 
with the market share of 44-47%. A special responsibility is also applicable 
towards natural legal monopolies. However, the concept of special 
responsibility is not taken into consideration if and when the dominant 
undertakings behaviour of abuse is assessed according to the effects.298  
 
7.4 What will the future look like?  
As the Tomra judgment and the Post Danmark judgment applied different 
tests for assessing abusive effect the future is uncertain. Will the economical 
great bulk-test concerning the hypothetical ‘as-efficient competitor’-test be 
applied or the effect-based seen from the Tomra judgment as Intel also 
conduct a loyalty rebate scheme.    
 
7.4.1 Legal Assessment of The Intel Decision299  
In 2009, The Commission fined Intel € 1.06 billion because of a number of 
practices that were having the effect of foreclosing the market.300 The 
competitor in mind, AMD, was detrimental for consumer on the market as it 
gave additional choice.301 Intel gave loyalty rebates to Dell and HP in 
exchange for that these OEMs should purchase 80-100% of the product x86 
central processing units from Intel.302 The judgment was based on the 
capacity of causing or the likeliness to have foreclosing effects.303 The 
Commission claimed that the ‘as-efficient competitor’-test is applicable 
according to case law and not the guidance paper as this was in effect after 
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the investigation of Intel’s potential abusive behaviour had started.304 
Instead the Commission used the criteria stated in the British Airways 
judgment that there is a tendency that the dominant undertaking is 
restricting competition305 contrary to the argumentation of Intel.306 The ‘as-
efficient competitor’-test was used which included an examination of the 
contestable share of the customer’s demand and relevant time horizon of 
viable costs.307 Professor Damien Geradin has criticized the decision on the 
basis that the assessment of foreclosure and consumer harm was only 
considered in theory.308  
 
CJEU’s interpretation of Post Danmark’s conduct was assessed through the 
criteria of likeliness and actuality concerning anti-competitive effects. The 
CJEU changed the wording after the Tomra judgment to only include 
potential effect in the anti-competitive test. In the pending judgment of Intel 
the CJEU has the possibility to take a firm decision on how to assess future 
cases. The ‘effect-based’ approach has been based upon a large number of 
judgments and established in case law. The effect on the market will be 
clear if Intel were not to be seen as abusing the market. On the other hand 
the fact that the CJEU used the test must be an indication that the test will 
be further used.309   
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8 Conclusion   
The Højesteret sent a question of preliminary ruling to CJEU in order to 
acquire clarification in the specific situation of Post Danmark’s legal 
conduct in the Danish postal service for unaddressed mail. Should Post 
Danmark conduct be seen as having anti-competitive effect on the market? 
The Danish Supreme court came to the conclusion that the conduct was seen 
as unlawful and had created anti-competitive effects through the application 
of the legal test of competition on the merits. The conclusion established the 
fact that pricing between average total cost and average incremental cost 
created anti-competitive effects as Post Danmark was able to increase its 
market share in proportion to Forbruger-Kontakt’s decrease. The Deutsche 
Post judgment did touch upon the question of average incremental costs but 
was primarily a case concerning service of general interest. It was 
interesting to see how the European court would deal with the concept of 
average incremental cost. Usually when undertakings applying prices on in 
between average incremental cost and average total cost no competition 
would be foreclosed but as Post Danmark enjoyed synergies by 
infrastructure and the common cost the ‘as-efficient competitor’-test was 
applied. The economical approach used by the court can be seen as a good 
attempt to acquire more legal certainty. The effect-based approach was 
applied together with the hypothetical ‘as-efficient competitor’-test. The 
court used the great-bulk test to find out if an ‘equally efficient competitor’ 
could not be foreclosed on the relevant market if it covered the great bulk of 
the costs attributable to the supply of the goods or services in question.  
 
The pricing abuse was dealt with the European court by applying a new 
economical test seeing to the costs and prices applied on the market. One 
can argue that this test will change the course of assessing anti-competitive 
conduct in the Unions competition law. However, the fact that the Tomra 
judgment was delivered only a few weeks later and contradicted the 
economical application of anti-competitive behavior cannot be seen as 
pacing the way for a future more concerned with the economical approach. 
On the other hand the decision from the Commission concerning Intel 
applies the ‘as-efficient competitor’-test. So the future will be certain when 
the judgment has been delivered. My conclusion must say that Post 
Danmark showed, a new way in assessing anti-competitive effects and that 
this was a new approach to future case law.  Post Danmark’s judgment will 
not change the course of future case law according to effects of abusive 
conduct under article 102 TFEU. 
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